Mubarak Hassan Ali and Mohamed Nour Awdo – France24 – Videos filmed on November 21, 2024, show fighters allied with the Sudanese military confiscating crates of European-origin mortar shells, which they say were intended for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the Sudanese paramilitary militia battling the army in an ongoing war that began on April 15, 2023. The shells were transported to Sudan despite a European Union arms embargo on the civil war-torn country. This article is the first part of a five-part investigation that delves into the complex journey these weapons took from European soil to the battlefields of Sudan.
Thanks to information contained in videos filmed by fighters from the Joint Protection Forces on November 21, 2021 (left), the FRANCE 24 Observers team was able to launch an investigation that confirmed that the mortar shells seen in the images were manufactured in Bulgaria, a member state of the European Union, by the company Dunarit (right). This article is the first part of a comprehensive five-part investigation. © FRANCE 24 – Observers
The scene resembles an inventory of goods. In videos posted on Twitter and Facebook on November 21, 2024, Sudanese fighters in military uniform, kneeling or even on the dirt, check dozens of identity cards, personal and religious photographs. These men belong to the Joint Forces, an alliance of armed groups operating in the Darfur region of western Sudan . These armed groups support the Sudanese regular army in the civil war against the Rapid Support Forces militias .
The videos show the fighters seizing a convoy of several vehicles in the middle of the desert. In the images, the fighters appear stunned. While checking a passport, they say in Zaghawa, a local dialect of Darfur: “What country do they belong to? Look, they are Jews working for an international organization.” The same man adds, appearing to confuse a Catholic Christian holy image with one of the documents he found, “These are people who are ready to do anything, even die in Sudan… They came to defend the Rapid Support Forces.” On several occasions, the man accuses the holders of these identity documents, who were likely injured while being detained by the armed group, of being “mercenaries.” No prisoners or corpses are visible in the videos.
The identity documents of these two “mercenaries” were shown several times on camera. This allows us to answer the Sudanese fighters’ questions: the passports shown in the videos belong to two Colombian citizens.
As we can see in the video clips, there are large wooden boxes with orange diamond-shaped signs affixed to them, warning of the presence of explosive materials, an internationally recognized sign indicating the danger of explosion. These boxes also contain cylindrical cardboard labels reading in English, “81mm Mortar HE.”
In the videos, Sudanese fighters in the joint forces show up close the munitions carried by the convoy: wooden boxes painted green and labeled “explosive” and cardboard cylinders containing ammunition. These weapons are labeled in white: 81mm high-explosive (HE) mortar shells.
“All these weapons were destined for the Rapid Support Forces.”
While displaying these munitions, the Joint Forces fighter made these accusations: “These weapons were destined for the Janjaweed [Editor’s note: the name given to the Rapid Support Forces]. Mohammed bin Zayed sent them.” Slamming his fist against a confiscated vehicle, the same man made the following accusation: “This, too, was sent by the UAE .”
A few hours later, the Sudan Liberation Movement, one of the armed groups within the Joint Forces, began issuing official statements about this massive weapons seizure. We learn more details about what prompted two foreigners to cross the Darfur desert with this ammunition.
“In a desert area, on Sudan’s borders with Libya and Chad , joint forces succeeded in uncovering a major arms smuggling attempt destined for the terrorist Rapid Support Forces militia,” the movement explained on its Facebook page. The Sudan Liberation Movement also revealed that the “mercenaries” were carrying coins from the United Arab Emirates. The armed movement did not clarify whether the men were Colombians, whom it accuses of being mercenaries, after capturing them before killing or wounding them.
Thanks to these footage filmed by the Joint Forces fighters, the FRANCE 24 Observers team was able to investigate the origin of the weapons seen in the videos. It was confirmed that the weapons were manufactured in a European Union member state. They were manufactured in Bulgaria and purchased by an Emirati company. Before entering Sudan and being seized by the Joint Forces, the convoy transported them to eastern Libya, an area controlled by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s army, which is allied with the United Arab Emirates. This Gulf state is frequently accused by UN experts of financially and militarily supporting the Rapid Support Forces, particularly to protect its strategic and economic interests in the region. The Emirati authorities have always denied these accusations.
European weapons manufactured in Bulgaria
The cardboard labels attached to these weapons indicate that they contain mortar bombs.
In this video, taken by fighters with the Joint Forces on November 21, 2024, at the fourth second, we clearly see the markings on the cardboard cylinders containing the munitions. These labels indicate that the weapons are “81 mm mortar bombs.”
“They are munitions that have been ubiquitous on all battlefields, particularly in Sudan, over the past few decades,” said Mike Lewis, a specialist in armed conflict and a former member of the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan. “Mortar bombs are explosives that are thrown upward from a cannon-shaped tube, which curves into a bell shape, and then fall on the target,” he added.
In a video taken by fighters with the joint forces on November 21, 2024, the man who captured the scene opens one of the ammunition boxes, and we see in his footage a black logo printed on the wood: “BG-RSE-0082-HT.”
This red iron engraving is the ISPM-15 code , a mandatory marking on wooden boxes. The first two letters indicate the country of origin, “BG,” which refers to Bulgaria .
Here’s another indication of the country of origin of this poster: it’s written in both English and French, but it contains two names written in Russian. Bulgaria uses the Russian alphabet: the two names on the poster belong to two women with common surnames in Bulgaria.
The contents of these munitions, which were written in code on the cardboard cylinder they were carried in, allow us to accurately identify the manufacturing party.
The codes refer to the following: M-6 is a type of detonator that detonates the ammunition. “81mm Mortar HE” refers to the type of ammunition itself: an 81mm high-explosive mortar bomb. “1+3 increment charges” refers to the number of ammunition launch cables , typical of this type of bomb.
Each of these military products has a six-digit serial number, which allows us to identify the producing company and its trade route. Each one begins with the number 46, according to an arms expert contacted by the France 24 Observers team. He confirmed that the serial number, which begins with 46, refers to the Bulgarian identification code and indicates that the ammunition was manufactured by the Bulgarian company Dunarit . The number 19 at the end of the serial number, according to the source, indicates the manufacturing date, 2019, which explains the information on the labels of the ammunition seized in Sudan.
On the Donarit website, we can confirm that this Bulgarian company does indeed manufacture 81mm high-explosive shells .
Additionally, a search of the company’s social media pages reveals images of mortar shells inside wooden boxes , similar in shape to the boxes seen in videos filmed in Sudan. The company’s boxes bear the same ISPM-15 code. The serial number is also engraved on the munitions recovered in Sudan.
The CEO of Donarit does not deny that these weapons were produced in his factories.
When contacted by the France 24 Observers team, the CEO of Donarit, Petar Petrov, did not deny that these mortar bombs were manufactured in the company’s factories. He explained in a phone call, saying:
There is very strict control over this type of goods in Bulgaria. As far as I know, everything contained in this contract [Editor’s note: which authorized the export of these weapons] was carried out in accordance with legal regulations.”
However, Petar Petrov could not believe that his company’s bombs were filmed in Sudan and did not acknowledge that the videos taken by fighters in the ranks of the joint forces constituted evidence of its presence in the country.
Bombs violate the EU arms embargo on Sudan.
But how were these bombs, manufactured in Bulgaria, a member state of the European Union, found in a convoy supplying weapons to the Rapid Support Forces? The European Union, of which Bulgaria is a member, has imposed a comprehensive arms embargo on Sudan since 1994. The current version of the embargo reads: “The sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and associated materiel, including weapons and ammunition… to Sudan by nationals of Member States or originating from a Member State.”
Nicholas Marsh, a researcher specializing in arms exports at the Oslo-based Peace Research Institute, comments:
The EU arms embargo on Sudan clearly applies to this type of ammunition. It is a very clear European policy. Of course, there are exceptions, but I cannot see how a transfer of weapons of this type to Sudan could have gone unnoticed. It is without a doubt a violation of European policy in this area.
Bulgarian authorities confirm that these weapons were not shipped directly from Bulgaria to Sudan. In response to Observers’ inquiries via email, the Interministerial Committee on Export Control, the body responsible for issuing arms export licenses in Bulgaria, confirmed that the sale was made “through a strictly monitored license to a government authority against which there is no arms export ban.” The committee also “categorically confirms that the competent Bulgarian authority has not granted any export license to Sudan” for this type of munition.
As the upcoming installments of the Freer Observers investigation confirm, the ammunition manufactured by the Bulgarian company Dunarit was not actually exported directly to Sudan. Instead, it was sold to an Emirati company widely known for transporting weapons to areas subject to international arms embargoes: International Golden Group.
European bombs in Sudan: Emirati contract worth fifty million euros
In the second part of our investigation into the presence of European-made mortar shells in Sudan, we delve into the secrets of the contract that delivered Bulgarian-made weapons to the battlefields in Sudan, despite the European Union’s arms embargo on the country. Thanks to exclusive documents, the FRANCE 24 Observers team was able to identify the company that oversaw this contract: International Golden Group, an Emirati company known for its work on several arms shipments to areas subject to arms embargoes.
In the first part of the series: On November 21, 2024, Sudanese fighters photographed their capture: mortar shells, they claimed, belonged to the Rapid Support Forces, the paramilitary militia fighting the Sudanese army in a civil war that has been ongoing since April 2023. These weapons, manufactured in Bulgaria, were transported to Sudan despite the European Union’s arms embargo on the war-torn country.
Julia Rougier contributed to this article.
At first glance, the Ministerial Committee for Export Control, the Bulgarian body responsible for granting arms export licenses, did not want to provide further information about the primary exporting country of the Dunarit mortar shells, which appeared in videos filmed in Sudan on November 21, 2024. The committee added: “The export was granted to the government of a country not subject to UN Security Council sanctions. The Bulgarian body responsible for transporting these products was notified and received a delivery certificate from the end user.”
However, a source who preferred to remain anonymous provided the Observers team with a copy of the aforementioned delivery certificate. This document, issued on August 16, 2020, by the General Command of the UAE Armed Forces, was full of valuable information about the delivery process. From this document, we learn that the final recipient of the Bulgarian-made mortar bombs was the UAE military itself.
These documents reveal that the quantity of mortar shells delivered was very large. They amounted to 15,000 81mm shells (similar to those seen in videos filmed in Sudan on November 21, 2024). The delivery also included 2,780 60mm shells, 30,000 82mm shells, and 11,464 120mm shells, a particularly powerful caliber. These weapons were delivered in two batches: the first in January and the second in February 2020. In total, these two companies, in addition to the UAE General Command, were mentioned: ARM-BG LTD as the supplier, and International Golden Group PJSC as the supplier. The manufacturer of these weapons, Dunarit, was not mentioned.
The France 24 Observers team was able to cross-reference this information with another document issued by a second source with access to information provided by the UAE military in the context of the arms sale process. This document represents the end user, which is supposed to guarantee to the arms manufacturer and the oversight body in the country of origin that the end user of the weapons is clearly known. In most cases, the latter also provides a set of commitments, particularly regarding the re-export of weapons.
This document, also issued by the UAE military, which identifies itself as the end-user, contains the same contract number as the first document and refers to the same two supply companies. Given this information, “it is possible to believe that these two documents relate to the same delivery,” according to Nicholas Marsh, a researcher specializing in arms exports at the Peace Research Institute , based in Oslo, Norway.
“The end user did not inform us of any additional export, I don’t know what happened next.”
However, this document, issued in October 2019, confirms that the UAE military is committed to “using weapons for the special needs of the UAE Armed Forces” and “not transferring, re-exporting, lending, or leasing them to a third party or to any country without the approval of the competent authorities in Bulgaria.”
When contacted by the FRANCE 24 Observers team to find out whether it had granted approval for these weapons to Sudan or to another party, the Bulgarian ministerial committee insisted that it had “not issued any license for the export of weapons to the state of Sudan.” For his part, the CEO of the Bulgarian company Donarit, Petar Petrov, provided us with further details, explaining:
“On the documents, we see the destination country for these weapons, but also the company [Editor’s note: International Golden Group] is a public company. We did not receive orders restricting exports to the UAE. This is what our committee examined. According to the established rules, when the end user decides to re-export them, they must inform in advance all parties involved in the delivery process: the factory, the relevant committees, all parties. In this case, they did not do that. I don’t know what happened next.”
Moreover, the second document refers to a much larger quantity of bombs, up to 105,000, while the information in the first document refers to a quantity of up to 60,000. This is not suspicious, according to Nicholas Marsh, who adds: “It is possible that further deliveries were authorized without the need for a new license. It is difficult to know whether the quantity representing the difference between what was stated in the end-user document and the delivery document [Editor’s note: Here, it refers to a difference in quantity of up to 45,000 mortar shells] was delivered.”
A contract estimated at 50 million euros
Here, Nicholas Marsh points out that the total cost of the approximately 105,000 mortar shells mentioned in the user document could reach 50 million euros, adding:
“This type of delivery is consistent with what a large non-state armed group would require, and frankly, it’s a huge amount for a group of this type. In contrast, if it’s a country in open conflict, it’s a relatively limited amount.”
The FRANCE 24 Observers team was able to match expert Nicholas March’s estimate of the value of this deal with those of the Omega Research Foundation , a network of researchers specializing in human rights violations involving defense or security equipment.
This estimated €50 million arms export is by no means a small figure for a country like Bulgaria . According to information compiled by the European Centre Against Arms Trade , the value of Bulgarian exports to the UAE between 2015 and 2020 [Editor’s note: recent estimates appear to be very low] ranged between €10 and €30 million per year.
In 2019, the year the deal was mentioned in the two documents reviewed by the FRANCE 24 Observers team, the value of Bulgaria’s exports to the UAE rose unexpectedly to nearly €83 million. Therefore, the purchase of 105,000 Bulgarian mortar shells to the UAE likely represented more than half of the total value of exports to the Gulf country in this extraordinary year.
ARM-PG Bulgarian Broker
In statements to the FRANCE 24 Observers editorial team, Bulgaria’s Ministerial Committee for Export Control insists on several occasions that the country “strictly respects all obligations in the area of export control and follows a responsible national policy.”
However, the nature of the intermediaries involved in this deal raises suspicions. Little information is available about ARM-BG, although the company holds an official license to export and import weapons. According to information available on Orbis, a website specializing in such matters, the company employs only four employees and appears to have generated its highest profits during the two years during which the Dunarit arms deal to the UAE took place. Its turnover reached over $78 million in 2019, then $106 million in 2020, before declining significantly to €6 million in 2021, a year in which ARM-BG entered a significant deficit. Its operating results indicate that it recorded losses of nearly €3 million this year.
Arsen Nazaryan, one of the directors of Arm-BG, insists on the legality of the deal in which his company participated, adding:
ARM-BG has submitted an application to the Bulgarian Ministerial Committee for Export Control to obtain an export license to the United Arab Emirates as an end user. The application contains all the required data and documents in accordance with applicable Bulgarian and European legislation, as well as the rules set by the United Nations.
In a phone call with the FRANCE 24 Observers team, the same person added, “We are an intermediary company. We do not carry out the export or import operations ourselves, nor do we transport the goods.” However, ARM-PG is listed as the “exporter or supplier” in the Emirati documents submitted to Bulgarian authorities.
When contacted by the Observers team a second time, Arm-BG Ltd declined to provide further information. The Bulgarian Ministerial Committee for Export Control, for its part, confirmed that it “has no evidence of Arm-BG Ltd’s involvement in the delivery of weapons to illegal end users or in illegal re-exports.”
International Golden Group, the UAE-based buyer, is implicated in the arms diversion scheme.
Another company mentioned in documents relating to the arms sale deal for the Bulgarian company Dunaret is International Golden Group (IGG). This company is identified as the “supplier” of the weapons to the UAE . Helene Klose, a researcher specializing in the arms sector at Omega Research Group, was able to gather information about this company through her work in the UAE arms market. She explains:
International Golden Group was founded in 2002. We believe the company was private or semi-private at the time, but it undoubtedly had ties to the UAE government. In 2017, the company presented itself as the primary supplier to the UAE Armed Forces and Ministry of Interior.
European arms sales to the United Arab Emirates are not subject to any sanctions or embargoes. However, International Golden Group is not an unknown company in the Gulf country: in addition to supplying the UAE military, the company is known for its practice of diverting weapons to conflict zones, according to several experts on the ground who spoke to the FRANCE 24 Observers team. Tony Fortin, who is responsible for gathering information on arms sales and companies specializing in the field, comments:
International Golden Group has a very bad reputation, well-known among arms manufacturers. This company has a reputation for operating as a kind of state within the UAE, allowing it to opaquely control the flow of weapons.
Its destabilizing activities are evident in the reports of the UN Panel of Experts on Libya, a country subject to a comprehensive arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council in 2011.
Every year, the aforementioned group of experts submits a report on the situation in Libya , in which it seeks, in particular, to identify the countries, companies, and individuals involved in violating this embargo. Since 2013 , this company has been identified as a major player in the transfer of hundreds of thousands of Albanian-made bullets to Benghazi in eastern Libya. The UN group’s report confirms that “International Golden Group was the party representing the UAE armed forces during the negotiations.”
In 2016, 2022, and 2023 , International Golden Group was linked to the UN arms embargo on Libya. The 2022 report details the transfer of 120mm mortar bombs. One of these bombs was used inside a civilian home in the Libyan capital, Tripoli, in 2020. During that period, the Tripoli area, controlled by the UN-recognized Libyan government, was experiencing a large-scale offensive by the forces of Khalifa Haftar, the dominant military commander in eastern Libya. This military offensive was supported by the United Arab Emirates and included mercenaries from the Russian Wagner Group.
In the same report, the report goes into more detail about incidents that occurred in 2013, stating: “While the ultimate buyer of these weapons was falsely identified as the United Arab Emirates [Editor’s note: based on documents provided by International Golden Group], these munitions were flown directly to Benghazi, Libya.” The flight transporting these weapons was overseen by an intermediary involved in the deal. While the initial flight itinerary indicated the UAE was bound for Libya, it was changed at the last minute.
The same experts ‘ 2016 report , which this time addressed the supply of Bulgarian missiles to Libya, states that the experts “asked Bulgaria to trace the destination (of these missiles)” and that “Bulgarian authorities informed the UN Panel of Experts that International Golden Group was the company that supplied these weapons and confirmed that the end user was the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates.”
This means that Bulgarian authorities were aware since at least 2016—three years before the UAE sent documents requesting permission to purchase mortar shells from Dunarit—that weapons being sold to International Golden Group as intended for the UAE military could be diverted.
Here, expert Nicholas Marsh comments again, saying: “It is assumed that in such cases, when Bulgaria receives information, it should share it with the rest of the European governments.” He adds:
From that moment on, Bulgarian authorities were required not to issue new arms export licenses to International Golden Group, and were also required to exercise extreme caution regarding exports to the UAE in general. Unfortunately, this has not been the case in practice.
Asked whether it had prior knowledge of numerous instances of arms diversion by International Group, documented by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya, when it licensed an arms export deal to the UAE in 2019, the Bulgarian Ministerial Committee for Export Control did not respond to a request for information from the FRANCE 24 Observers team.
The FRANCE 24 Observers team does not have the information to trace the final leg of the Bulgarian-made ammunition’s journey to Sudan, nor to determine whether this shipment was transported by the International Golden Group to the eastern region of Libya controlled by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Neither the Bulgarian Ministerial Committee for Export Control nor the International Golden Group responded to our requests for clarification.
But to get more details, we have another way: tracing the men who accompanied the Bulgarian ammunition convoy to Sudan, whose identity documents appeared in videos taken by Sudanese fighters on November 24, 2024.
The passports shown in videos taken by Sudanese fighters on November 21, 2024, reveal the identities of two Colombian nationals who appear to have been in the arms convoy: Christian L. and Miguel P.
European Bombs in Sudan: The Mercenaries’ Route from the UAE to Sudan
In the third part of the FRANCE 24 Observers team’s investigation into the presence of European-made mortar shells in Sudan, we profile the men involved in transporting these munitions. These are Colombian nationals whose identity documents were shown in videos filmed in Sudan. Among them is Christian L., who documents his travels on his social media accounts. The locations he traveled to increase the likelihood of the UAE’s involvement in transporting these European weapons to Sudan, in violation of the arms embargo on the country.
In the second part of our investigation, thanks to exclusive documentation, the FRANCE 24 team was able to confirm the transfer of mortar shells to Sudan via an Emirati company called International Golden Group. This company is known for its involvement in arms transfers to eastern Libya for the forces of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, a close ally of the United Arab Emirates.
Although it is difficult to trace the final leg of the Bulgarian-made mortars’ journey to Sudan, one thing available in videos showing the Bulgarian company Dunarit’s mortars in the Sudanese desert can help provide further details: personal documents belonging to two Colombian men, Christian L. and Miguel P.
There is little information about Miguel B. on social media, but Christian L. documented his daily life in minute detail through his accounts, posting photos of his travels and workouts. These photos are no longer available, and all of Christian L.’s social media accounts have either been deleted or are inaccessible.
From Colombia to Abu Dhabi via Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris
On October 5, the bodybuilding enthusiast, whose identity documents were shown in videos filmed in Sudan, indicated that he was a former Colombian soldier and documented his first trip by taking a photo at Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris, France.
Videos taken a few days later showed Christian L. traveling from Paris to the United Arab Emirates. He posed for photos on a beach in the capital, Abu Dhabi, the same city where the International Golden Group , which had purchased Bulgarian mortar shells, is headquartered.
On November 17, 2024, four days before his personal documents fell into the hands of Sudanese fighters, Christian Al posted his last video. The images show him crossing a desert area under a bright sun. He appears to have taken the photos from a vehicle while walking.
These photos were not taken in the UAE, as Christian L.’s passport, seen in videos taken by Sudanese fighters, shows an exit stamp from the Gulf country dated October 11, 2024. This suggests the man only spent a few days in the UAE capital, Abu Dhabi.
Christian L’s latest video taken on the border between Libya and Sudan
The British fake news fact-checking platform Bellingcat was able to determine the geographic coordinates of the location where Christian L.’s video was filmed. It was filmed in Libya, specifically in Al-Jawf, the last Libyan town on the road to the border with Sudan.
This means that Christian L. was on the border between Libya and Sudan when the video was taken, where his personal documents fell into the hands of Sudanese fighters from the joint forces three days later. Christian L. was traveling with crates containing Bulgarian-made ammunition destined for the Rapid Support Forces, according to the Sudanese fighters who filmed the shipment on November 21, 2024.
Ali Trayo, an advisor and negotiator for the Sudan Liberation Movement, confirmed some of this information to the France 24 Observers team, explaining:
Colombian mercenaries were captured or killed on the border with Libya while crossing the desert. These mercenaries were weapons experts and had come there to train Rapid Support Forces fighters.
For its part, articles published by Colombian newspapers, including the investigative media outlet La Silla Vacia , reported contact with Colombian soldiers who served in the same military units as Christian L. According to the same newspaper, more than 300 former Colombian soldiers traveled to Sudan to provide assistance to the Rapid Support Forces, all of whom transited through the United Arab Emirates and then Benghazi in eastern Libya, where they were taken care of by fighters within the Rapid Support Forces. Eastern Libya, and specifically Benghazi, where the Bulgarian ammunition convoy traveled, are areas under the control of the regime of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, a close ally of the UAE in the region. According to sources speaking to Colombian media, the goal of this operation was to gather up to 1,800 Colombian mercenaries in Sudan to carry out dangerous combat missions.
“If the authorities discovered that someone had leaked information, they would order them to settle scores in the desert,” a Colombian soldier, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told the local newspaper La Silla Vacia.
Companies linked to the UAE are behind the mercenary operations.
According to La Silla Vacia, the former Colombian soldiers were recruited by a Colombian company called A4SI. This company is run by a former Colombian soldier living in Dubai, who is accused of having ties to Colombian drug networks. It is also likely that he signed a second contract with the Emirati company Global Security Services Group.
According to an internal A4SI document obtained by the FRANCE 24 Observers team, the arms company asked applicants to provide specific personal information: they were asked whether they were able to “carry a weapon,” whether they had “military experience,” and the location of any tattoos on their bodies. Most armies around the world prohibit, or at least verify, tattoos on their personnel. This information confirms that A4SI specializes in recruiting fighters and security personnel.
An investigation by the Colombian newspaper La Silla Vacia reveals that Christian L. was not an isolated case: a large number of former Colombian soldiers like him fought in Libya and then in Sudan, working for two companies, one Colombian and the other Emirati. These mercenaries were involved in transporting Bulgarian-made mortar bombs from Libya to Sudan.
“There is an undeclared alliance between the Haftar regime in Libya and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.”
For Suleiman Baldo, a Sudanese researcher and founder of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker , the convoy transporting the ammunition shipment falls within a widely known arms smuggling route for the Rapid Support Forces. He adds:
Libyan Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s regime’s support for the Rapid Support Forces predates the Sudanese civil war. This is an undeclared alliance between the two sides, as the RSF provided support to Haftar’s forces for a period during the Libyan civil war. Subsequently, as a form of reciprocity, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar sent ammunition, weapons, and oil supplies to the RSF, which continue to arrive via smuggling channels from Libya. To secure these exchanges, Haftar has specifically turned to an Islamist militia called Subul al-Salam, which operates around the city of Kufra.
Kufra is an oasis town near the city of Al-Jawf in southeastern Libya. It is the area where Christian L. filmed his last videos before the attack on the arms convoy in which he participated.
Now that we know how the munitions arrived, the next question remains: What will these mortars be used for once they reach Sudanese territory? The France 24 Observers team was able to gather testimonies and video recordings taken by fighters and residents in conflict zones, which allow us to understand the devastating impact of this type of munition on Sudanese civilians. The France 24 Observers investigation also shows that these Bulgarian-made mortars have indeed reached the battlefields in Sudan.
In this video, taken by a Sudanese fighter, we can see another fighter firing a 120mm mortar shell manufactured by the Bulgarian company Donarit. The image shows the number 46 circled in the image, a code for munitions manufactured by this company.
European Bombs in Sudan: “When a mortar bomb falls on a market, it causes deaths”
In the fourth part of our investigation into the presence of European-made mortar shells in Sudan, we focus on the implications of supplying these munitions to a country torn apart by civil war. Mortar shells are being used systematically to directly target civilians, particularly by the Rapid Support Forces in Darfur, as confirmed by testimonies from several residents to the FRANCE 24 Observers team.
In the third part of the series of articles, in videos taken on November 21, 2024, we can see the identity documents of Colombian citizens escorting a convoy transporting Bulgarian-made missiles as they entered Sudan. Posts on one of their social media accounts prove that these men were recruited by Emirati companies to serve as volunteer fighters in Sudan.
In videos filmed on November 21, 2024, in the Sudanese desert, fighters with the joint forces confirmed that the munitions were destined for the Rapid Support Forces , the paramilitary militia that has been fighting the Sudanese army in a civil war that has been ongoing since April 15, 2023.
But how can we verify that the mortar shells manufactured by the Bulgarian company Donarit were intended for the Rapid Support Forces and were actually used by them on the battlefield? Several armed groups in Darfur, currently allied with the Sudanese army within the so-called Joint Forces, also benefited from Emirati support at an earlier stage in their history.
“The United Arab Emirates allocates all its assistance to the Rapid Support Forces.”
This is confirmed by Suleiman Baldo, the Sudanese researcher and founder of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, who adds:
Throughout its opposition to the Khartoum government, which ended with the signing of a peace agreement in 2020, the Sudan Liberation Movement [Editor’s note: one of the armed groups in the joint forces] and most of the armed groups in Darfur had their bases in Libya, in areas controlled by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces.
Khalifa Haftar’s regime in eastern Libya is itself backed by the United Arab Emirates , and thus, indirectly, armed movements originating from Darfur were also allied with the UAE. They benefited from the weapons supplied to Khalifa Haftar’s army, particularly those coming from the UAE. When these armed groups headed to Libya before returning to Sudan following the Juba Agreements, they received military equipment as a parting gift, a large portion of which consisted of weapons supplied by the UAE.
All of that came to a halt with the outbreak of the Sudanese civil war in April 2023: today, the situation is crystal clear, with the UAE and Khalifa Haftar’s regime providing full support to the Rapid Support Forces.
Shells manufactured by Donarit have already reached the battlefields in Sudan.
Rapid Support Forces fighters routinely film themselves during battles, including when committing abuses against civilians, as we uncovered in an investigation published in 2023.
A video posted in September 2023, which several Sudanese social media accounts confirmed was filmed in Omdurman, adjacent to the capital, Khartoum, caught the editorial team’s attention. The images show a man firing an artillery shell. The phone used to capture the scene was placed over the munitions, allowing us to easily read the codes printed on the shells: they were manufactured by the Bulgarian company Dunarit.
At first glance, it’s difficult to identify which camp the person in the video belongs to. The man firing the mortar from the portable gun was not wearing any recognizable military uniform. However, Suleiman Baldo comments, “They are the hallmarks of militia fighters, dressed in civilian-like clothing with some military paraphernalia, such as their slippers.”
However, it is possible to learn more details about the affiliation of these men by identifying the owner of the TikTok account that posted this video, based on the username in the video. The video was removed from the platform for violating its terms of use, but the account remains active.
On TikTok, the account owner follows a large number of accounts belonging to fighters in the Rapid Support Forces and its commander, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo , known as Hemeti.
In another video, posted on September 12, 2023, filmed outside a restaurant, a young child is seen repeating phrases he clearly memorized. The person filming the video congratulates him.
The France 24 Observers team showed this video to 11 Sudanese. Of these, 10 confirmed that the person who shot the video was a fighter in the Rapid Support Forces. Among them, one commented, who preferred to remain anonymous:
This is like a child trying to impress the militia fighter he filmed reciting a poem. The child begins, “We will set fire to the General Command Headquarters,” referring to the army’s General Staff headquarters. He then repeats, “The state is ours, even if you say otherwise.” It’s a defiant statement. In the end, the man who filmed the scene agrees with the child.
In sum, all of this confirms that ammunition manufactured by the Bulgarian company Dunarit was already present on the battlefields of the Sudanese civil war, even before the release of videos showing mortar shells seized in the desert by the Joint Forces during November 2024.
The shipment number on the shells fired by RSF fighters in September 2023 indicates they were manufactured in 2019, just like those sold by Dunaret to the Emirati company International Golden Group. Documents related to this deal also indicate that the sold shipment actually included 120mm shells, similar to those seen being fired by a militia fighter, likely a member of the RSF.
Mortar shells, a very dangerous weapon for civilians
The transfer of Bulgarian-made ammunition to Sudan constitutes a violation of the European Union’s 1994 arms embargo on the country. “Moreover, if the ammunition was transported via Libya, the parties responsible for transporting it violated the UN arms embargo on Libya twice: once when it was transported to Libyan territory and again when it was transported to Sudan,” a former UN expert who requested anonymity confirmed.
Regardless of the legal aspect, the methods used to deliver these European munitions to the Rapid Support Forces have catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Mortar shells of the same caliber as those sold to International Golden Group by Dunarit are routinely used in deadly shelling of Sudanese civilians, particularly by the Rapid Support Forces.
“If a mortar shell is fired into an area where there are civilians, there is a high probability that it will cause harm to them.”
Mike Lewis, a researcher specializing in armed conflict and a former member of the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan, explains:
There are two important things to know about mortar shells. First, they are used to target locations we don’t necessarily see. Furthermore, because mortars are poorly accurate weapons, because they are not guided, if a mortar shell is fired into an area where civilians are present, there is a significant risk of civilian casualties.
There is a long history in Sudan of the use of mortars or heavy shells on areas densely populated with civilians. Since the beginning of the civil war in 2023, we have found artillery shells in markets, hospitals, and refugee camps.
In this video, which was filmed in Omdurman, as confirmed by several local accounts on X and Facebook , we actually see four fighters supporting the Rapid Support Forces firing a 120mm mortar shell at an unidentified target. This shell was not manufactured by Donarit, but it was of the same caliber as the one seen in a September 2023 video in which RSF militia fighters fired explosives manufactured by Donarit.
This video was taken around December 9, 2024, when Omdurman was witnessing violent clashes between the army and the Rapid Support Forces.
In the following days, several Sudanese organizations and media outlets reported the deaths of several civilians in “heavy artillery shelling” by the Rapid Support Forces, a term commonly used to refer to mortar attacks. A video taken on December 10, 2024, depicts the deaths of all passengers on a bus after being hit by a RSF shell.
Although numerous social media accounts linked the video showing Rapid Support Forces fighters firing mortar shells at Omdurman to the bus being hit by the shell, the France 24 Observers team was unable to independently verify that the bus was indeed hit by a RSF shell.
In Darfur, a series of massacres were committed by the Rapid Support Forces using mortar shells.
Away from areas of intense combat, Rapid Support Forces fighters sometimes directly target civilian gatherings with mortar shells. These massacres have occurred particularly in the Darfur region of western Sudan, where the Rapid Support Forces are accused of systematically committing ethnic cleansing against non-Arab populations. The 2024 UN Panel of Experts report on Sudan documented one such incident, an attack on El Geneina, the capital of the western Darfur region, between April and November 2023.
More recently, other cases of deliberate targeting of civilians were documented in El Fasher, a city in Darfur. This area, which has been under siege by the Rapid Support Forces since the beginning of the civil war, hosts a large number of refugees, many of whom have fled violence in other parts of Darfur, which are regularly attacked by the Rapid Support Forces.
During these attacks, many indiscriminate mortar shellings were carried out by militia forces. This occurred, for example, on December 31, 2024, in the Abu Shouk refugee camp, northwest of El Fasher. As local humanitarian organizations ‘ social media posts show, the camp was struck by Rapid Support Forces on the same day, including attacks on homes and a school . According to the local humanitarian organization, the Abu Shouk Emergency Room, these attacks resulted in at least one death.
Photos taken at the scene and published by local media outlet Ain Network show the mortar shells used. In this case, the manufacturer of the shells could not be identified.
A similar scenario occurred on January 24, 2025: From the early morning hours until the evening, 117 shells were fired at the camp, killing eight people and wounding dozens more, according to the emergency room in Abu Shuk camp.
Images published by the same NGO show that the mortar shells used in this attack were not Bulgarian-made. Rather, they were manufactured in the former Yugoslavia .
“The site that witnessed the most deadly raids was the camp market.”
On February 20, 2025, Mohammed Adam, a member of the emergency room in Abu Shouk refugee camp, spoke about a horrific situation inside the camp, adding:
Now, the army soldiers have made some progress, and the Rapid Support Forces fighters have been forced to retreat 7 to 10 kilometers from the camp. They continue to fire at us from a distance because Abu Shouk camp allows access to army positions. This is why the Rapid Support Forces have been shelling civilian sites with heavy weapons and mortar shells, with the aim of forcing them to relocate and opening the way to the army positions.
The Rapid Support Forces bomb public buildings, markets, and hospitals, preventing civilians from receiving medical treatment, finding food, or returning to work. The goal is to force them to leave for a safer location, thus vacating the area for their own benefit.
The site of the most deadly airstrikes was the last open market in the camp. People frequent this market after the main market closes. When a mortar shell fell on the market recently, a large number of people were killed and dozens were injured.
In total, since the beginning of the civil war, we have counted over 500 casualties. We took care of them when they were injured but later died. There are also people who die immediately after the airstrikes. We transport their bodies directly to the cemetery. We couldn’t include them in the statistics, and we believe their number exceeds 300. We are currently collecting the names of all the deceased to post on our Facebook page.
For expert Mike Lewis, this high number of civilian casualties is not surprising, given the technical characteristics of mortars used in past raids on civilian areas by both the RSF and the Sudanese army. Lewis comments, “Is it possible to know who supplied these mortars to the RSF, and what harm they caused to civilians? It seems obvious that the extent of this harm is to be expected.”
When contacted by email and phone with the FRANCE 24 Observers team, International Golden West did not respond to a request for comment. This means it is important to establish whether the company was aware that the ammunition it purchased in 2019 was being transferred to Sudan today, with all the repercussions we are now aware of.
In any case, International Golden Group continues its business activities: it is a key player in organizing one of the largest arms exhibitions in the Middle East, the EDEX Salon, which took place last February in Abu Dhabi. In the final article by the Observers team in this extensive investigation, we will reveal a large number of partnerships linking Golden Group International with French and European companies, despite the Emirati company’s well-documented history of arms diversion.
European bombs in Sudan: International Golden Group… an Emirati company obtains Bulgarian shells and European partnerships
In this fifth and final part of our in-depth investigation into the presence of European-origin mortar shells in Sudan, we delve into the current activities of the Emirati company International Golden Group, which is behind the transfer of these shells. Although this Emirati company and its parent company, the Emirati company Edge Group, are implicated in several arms diversion cases documented in reports issued by the United Nations and non-governmental organizations, several French companies continued, until recently, to sign partnership contracts with these companies.
In the fourth part of our in-depth investigation series, we explore the deadly consequences of the supply of Bulgaria-style mortar shells to Sudan, photographed by Sudanese fighters on November 21, 2024. These weapons have been used repeatedly by parties to Sudan’s ongoing civil war to directly target civilians. The Rapid Support Forces have been repeatedly shelling a refugee camp in Darfur with these shells, resulting in numerous casualties.
Although the arms purchase deal, which allowed the Bulgarian-made missiles to reach Sudan, was completed in 2019, there is no evidence that the company subsequently ceased operations.
The FRANCE 24 Observers team contacted Donarit to find out whether it had signed other similar contracts with International Group. The Bulgarian company declined to provide further information. The Emirati company did not respond to our questions.
If there’s one thing that’s certain, it’s that International Golden Group continues its extensive activity in the UAE and internationally. This missile supply and security services company was acquired by Edge Group in January 2024, a consortium of defense companies funded by the UAE state.
Wholesale partnerships with European and French institutions since 2023
Shortly before its acquisition, International Golden Group expanded its partnerships, particularly with French companies. In February 2023, the Emirati company entered into a partnership with a joint venture of the French defense company Safran . According to Safran, the goal of this partnership is to develop navigation technology and military binoculars to “meet the needs of the UAE Ministry of Defense and other local entities.” All of this is being carried out at International Golden Group’s headquarters and under the leadership of the Tawazun Economic Program, a public fund in the UAE dedicated to the defense industry. The head of the Safran subsidiary visited these new headquarters on February 13, 2025, shortly before the opening of IDEX, the largest arms exhibition in the UAE, in which the French company participated .
And still in February 2023, it was the turn of Nexter, the French state-owned Leclerc tank manufacturer, to enter into a partnership with International Golden Group . This time, the goal of this partnership is to develop the UAE military’s Leclerc tanks “with the aim of ensuring its superiority in the field for the next three decades,” according to the French group. The industrial group to which Nexter belongs, now KNDS France, was also present at this year’s IDEX .
There is also a long- standing partnership dating back to 2009 between the Emirati company and Thales, a French aerospace and defense conglomerate. This partnership was initially aimed at “ensuring the protection of critical infrastructure, particularly those related to the exploitation of oil and gas resources in the United Arab Emirates.” In 2017, the partnership doubled in size with the signing of an agreement with Thales Optronique, a subsidiary of the French group, according to a cable published by the UAE’s state-run news agency.
The text of this telegram was amended the following day to remove the reference to the French group. Although the FRANCE 24 Observers team contacted the company, Thales did not respond to our questions. Given these circumstances, it was not possible to determine whether Thales continued its relationship with the Emirati companies International Golden Group and Edge Group.
From Spain’s Indra to Italy’s Leonardo , this year’s IDEX arms fair, held from February 17 to 21, 2025 , was in fact an opportunity for European defense companies, which appeared to be rushing to sign contracts with International Golden Group or its new parent company, EDGE Group. EDGE Group is one of IDEX’s “strategic partners,” according to its website .
For his part, Tony Fortin of the Armament Observatory , an organization specializing in gathering information on armaments and their actors, explained:
For the Emiratis, the goal of these major partnerships is to share expertise. This expertise will enable the UAE to produce its own military equipment, thus building its defense apparatus. This is a counterweight to European arms exports to this country, which are extremely important.
Big deals as usual for International Golden Group and Edge Group during IDEX 2025
International Golden Group also won one of the largest contracts during IDEX to supply ammunition to the UAE military, for a total sum of up to 179 million euros. As part of similar arms deals reportedly intended for the UAE military, International Golden Group also exported weapons to Libya, as documented in reports by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya.
There is no evidence that all the technologies and equipment acquired by International Golden Group, through partnerships with European groups, were subsequently transferred to Sudan to assist the Rapid Support Forces.
However, the diversion of such weapons by a company known for repeatedly violating international arms embargoes is not unprecedented. An investigation published by Amnesty International in November 2024 revealed that defensive systems for military vehicles manufactured by French companies were found in Sudan mounted on armored vehicles used by the Rapid Support Forces.
The Emirati company responsible for this transfer is Edge Group, which also manufactures the armored vehicle model on which the French defense systems are installed and is the parent company of International Golden Group. These systems were developed by the French companies Lacroix Défense and KNDS France.
Contacted by the FRANCE 24 Observers team regarding the findings of Amnesty International’s investigation, Lacroix Defense confirmed that it had “supplied the UAE Armed Forces with Galex self-defense systems.” The French group added, “This equipment was transferred in strict compliance with the export licenses obtained by Lacroix, with non-re-export certificates.” Lacroix also insisted that the Galex systems are “a passive self-defense solution” and have no offensive nature. The company did not respond to our inquiry seeking to know whether the UAE had requested a license to export these defense systems to Sudan.
KNDS France, for its part, asserts that it “was not the exporting party and only made a sale in France on behalf of Lacroix. In this regard, KNDS France was not aware of the end user during the processing or transportation of this order.”
Despite the above, KNDS France was present at IDEX 2025. The company, which is 50 percent owned by the French state, displayed photos of its participation in the exhibition and visits by French government officials, such as Minister of the Armed Forces Sébastien Lecornu . Alongside the KNDS France pavilion, another pavilion displayed Nimr armored vehicles manufactured by the Emirati company Edge Group.
Some groups refuse to cooperate with the International Golden Group, so how do French companies do that?
Here, Tony Fortin, an expert at the Arms Observatory, an organization specializing in gathering information on armaments and their actors, notes that the relationship between French defense manufacturing companies and the United Arab Emirates is long-standing and deep. He adds:
It should be noted that, in 2011, 70 percent of the (military) equipment used in the UAE was French-made. This was achieved through numerous partnerships. In the 1990s, naval technologies were sold after the UAE purchased several French manufacturing sites. Satellite and communications technologies were then sold. EDIC, the former name of EDGE Group, was managed by Luc Fogneron, the former CEO and chairman of Thales. France has already allowed the UAE to acquire its existing weapons manufacturing capabilities.
The problem today goes beyond the risk of arms diversion. The UAE’s policy toward countries such as Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia is documented in reports by UN experts, for example. We learn today that some international defense industry groups are refusing to cooperate with International Golden Group or Edge Group. How can French companies do this? These companies must provide clarifications.
In contacts with the France 24 Observers editorial team, all European and French companies mentioned in this article confirmed that they operate in compliance with local and international regulations pertaining to their products. The editorial team published the text of these companies’ responses, which included precise clarifications on the aforementioned data.
