Ahmed Kamel – Egypt Daily News
Egypt has firmly denied reports that it is prepared to grant Ethiopia access to the Red Sea in exchange for concessions over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, underscoring Cairo’s unyielding stance in one of Africa’s most consequential geopolitical disputes.
In a statement carried by the state-run Middle East News Agency, an official Egyptian source categorically dismissed what it described as unfounded claims that Cairo would consider offering Addis Ababa maritime access as part of negotiations over the dam. The source stressed that Egypt’s position on water security remains unchanged and that it continues to reject any unilateral measures affecting its share of Nile waters.
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, built on the Blue Nile in western Ethiopia, has been a source of persistent tension between Ethiopia and downstream nations Egypt and Sudan for more than a decade. Ethiopia views the massive hydroelectric project as central to its economic transformation and energy security. Egypt, which relies on the Nile for more than 90 percent of its freshwater needs, regards the dam as an existential issue.
Cairo’s denial comes amid renewed regional speculation about shifting alliances and potential diplomatic trade-offs in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin. According to the Egyptian statement, governance and security arrangements concerning the Red Sea are limited strictly to the countries that border it, describing the waterway as directly linked to the national security of littoral states. No non-littoral state, the source said, has the right to participate in understandings or frameworks related to the sea, an apparent reference to Ethiopia, which has been landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993.
Ethiopian officials, including Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, have repeatedly emphasized what they describe as their country’s legitimate need for maritime access, framing it as both an economic necessity and a matter of national interest. In recent speeches, Abiy has argued that Ethiopia’s population size and economic ambitions make reliance on external ports a long-term strategic vulnerability. Ethiopia currently depends heavily on ports in Djibouti for the vast majority of its trade.
These comments have raised concerns among neighboring states, particularly in the context of Ethiopia’s memorandum of understanding signed in early 2024 with Somaliland, a self-declared republic not internationally recognized. The agreement reportedly included provisions for port access in exchange for Ethiopian recognition, a move that sparked strong objections from Somalia and drew international scrutiny.
Egypt, for its part, has deepened its diplomatic and security engagement with Somalia in recent months, a development widely interpreted as part of a broader regional balancing effort. Cairo has framed its involvement as support for Somali sovereignty and stability, while analysts see it as also linked to Egypt’s strategic competition with Ethiopia.
The Nile dispute itself remains unresolved despite years of African Union-led negotiations and intermittent international mediation efforts involving the United States and the European Union. Talks have repeatedly stalled over the pace of filling the dam’s reservoir and the establishment of a legally binding framework for drought management and data sharing. Ethiopia has proceeded with successive stages of filling the reservoir, arguing that the process has not caused significant harm downstream. Egypt disputes that assessment and insists on binding guarantees to protect its water supply during prolonged droughts.
International water law principles including equitable and reasonable utilization and the obligation not to cause significant harm, are central to the competing legal arguments advanced by the parties. Egypt maintains that unilateral actions undermine cooperative basin management, while Ethiopia contends that colonial-era Nile water agreements unfairly excluded upstream countries.
The Red Sea dimension adds another layer of complexity to an already fraught regional landscape. The waterway is one of the world’s most strategically vital maritime corridors, linking the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean and serving as a critical artery for global trade and energy shipments. Egypt, which controls the Suez Canal, considers Red Sea security a core national interest.
By publicly rejecting the notion of a maritime quid pro quo, Cairo appears intent on signaling both domestically and internationally that its Nile policy is not subject to transactional bargaining. The statement reinforces Egypt’s long-standing message: water security is non-negotiable, and the governance of strategic waterways such as the Red Sea is the prerogative of coastal states alone.
With no comprehensive agreement on the dam in sight and regional rivalries intensifying, the intersection of Nile water politics and Red Sea geopolitics suggests that tensions between Cairo and Addis Ababa are likely to remain a defining feature of Northeast African diplomacy for the foreseeable future.
